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as he says, to maximize the opportunities permitted them under the agreement.

I think that assumption is a questionable assumption.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, first of all, I want to thank the Senator for yielding me this time. We are talking about what is permitted under the 5-year agreement. We agreed to parity on the ABM's, that each side is to have two sites under this agreement, and that is what I am talking about. In the interim agreement the Soviets are permitted to have 50 percent more in numbers of strategic weapons and this is corroborated by all witnesses we heard.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I understand that, but—

Mr. JACKSON. And under the interim agreement the Soviets are permitted to have four times the throw-weight. The Senator's position, as I understand it, is that we have to take into consideration the bombers and the forward bases. Well, let us mention one thing that is brought up constantly—Secretary McNamara brought it up several years ago—that we have a little over 7,000 warheads in Europe. That is a classic comment. But warheads without delivery systems are not truly strategic weapons.

We have a limited number of airbases in Europe capable of delivering atomic weapons. The Soviets have over 600 IRBM's and MRBM's that can hit every one of those bases—just with missiles—and with a lot of missiles left over. We do not have a single IRBM or MRBM in Europe.

So when we talk about what we have in the forward areas, I would point out that they are all covered by Soviet missiles plus the Soviet fighter bomber forces in central Europe. Of course, here again, we are talking about NATO and NATO defenses and we are talking about the Mediterranean.

So I want merely to observe that when one gets into the numbers racket with nuclear weapons, he can fall into the dangerous fallacy of assuming that all warheads in a stockpile are capable of being delivered.

What we are really addressing ourselves to here is the question of having a stable relationship with survivable forces on each side. That is what we are talking about. I do not follow the basic logic or reasoning on the part of those who say that we cannot have parity in strategic arms with the Soviets.

That is what I am suggesting, that we be in a position to stand for and argue for parity with the Soviets in SALT phase II.

We agreed on parity on the ABM. So all I am saying is that we should settle for parity in offensive arms, too. I remember Secretaries of Defense coming before Congress and before the Senate for confirmation both Republican and Democratic, all arguing for superiority.

Now under the interim agreement, we found ourselves not even settling for parity but for subparity. I am willing to go along on the interim agreement, even though it gives them an interim advantage in numbers and throw-weight, provided it is our declared purpose in SALT phase II talks, to get parity in the offensive strategic arms area. That

is what my amendment is all about—to get the parity in offensive arms that we obtain in connection with the ABM treaty.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I can only reiterate that the information we obtained from the Defense Department was in terms of what they call equivalent megatonnage, the Soviet Union has about the same as the United States.

Much has been made—and the Senator has done this before in talking about the SS-9's—of the fact that this country deliberately made the decision not to put our nuclear capacity into these big weapons. We chose the smaller weapons. I think it was a wise decision.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I was involved in that decision.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But the SS-9 has become a kind of scare weapon. It frightens everyone. I am glad that the Senator would agree. However, I cannot understand why the Senator makes so much of the SS-9's, because it is comparable to weapons that we could have made but we chose not to. We chose instead to make a sufficient number of smaller ones.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, for what possible purpose would a nation deploy a missile with a 25-megaton payload capability if it was not for some sort of counterforce?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It may be that they were not as wise as we were. We could have made that decision.

I have seen them make 25-ton trucks years ago which were not efficient at all, but it was just to show that they could do it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized for 3 additional minutes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I would not undertake to analyze the psychology that causes people to do more vigorous things than do other people.

In the testimony we had—not only from the Defense Department, but also from some of the others—the Defense Department thinks that every year is about the right time to scare us in order to get their appropriations. However, the CIA, Mr. Helms, and others who testified do not agree that this is the more efficient way and that we should not be so concerned about their SS-9's when we have more than enough Minuteman's which are deliverable and, may I say, are more accurate.

Sometimes Americans, including the Senator from Washington, brag about our superior technology. At other times they have a different view and they talk about the Russians outdoing us all the time—that they were widening the gap.

Mr. JACKSON. I never said they had technological superiority.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator said they were widening the gap. I suppose he meant that they would take over in superior technology in the next 5 years. I do not know why the Senator would say that.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, let us be accurate. I made it very clear in my

statement. What I said was that currently we have superior technology. What I mean is that in the period ahead, while we are now ahead technologically, suppose that in MIRVing they can move in and equal us in a short time. In fact, I said that they could test MIRV's at any moment. These are facts corroborated by testimony before the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is no testimony that they have tested it. I suppose that they could if they are foolish enough to go through all of these exotic weapons systems. I do not believe that they will if they have any confidence that we will live up to the agreement.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I think the whole thing concerns the question of whether we can induce in each other some degree of confidence that the other side means what it says when it signs agreements like this.

Mr. President, I do not wish to take time to play the numbers game.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized for 3 additional minutes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I said the same thing. The Secretary of Defense came back immediately, almost within hours, and said that we have got to have the new and very sophisticated weapons such as Trident and the B-1 and all of the things that we have been voting on recently.

All I think it does is to create a suspicion in the minds of the military leaders of Russia and they doubt our sincerity. And now we doubt their sincerity when they say they are going to do what we have already been doing in this Congress. It is the old problem of tit for tat, and each time we raise the suspicions that the others will do the same.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, that is all I object to about it.

Mr. JACKSON. All I am asking is what is wrong with parity so that we have the same number of land-based ICBM's and sea-based missiles? As the Senator knows, under the interim agreement the Soviets are permitted 62 Y-class submarines to our 44—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But with respect to the numbers, as I have already said, we do not disagree on them.

Mr. JACKSON. What about the Soviet throw-weight advantage confirmed in the interim agreement?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, on the throw-weights, when they are concentrated, I have not talked about big versus small ones. I would prefer more of the smaller ones.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I would say to the Senator, we do not have more of the smaller ones, because when we agree on the interim agreement—we have fewer delivery systems. All I am saying is what is wrong with an agreement which would give us parity?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is as—